Q&A
Dr Michael Fullilove, Executive Director, Lowy Institute; Member of the Council, IISS
Secretary Mattis, first of all let me commend you, if I may, for taking on your current post with all its stresses and strains. For many of us, sir, you are the hope of the side.
General, your speech focused on the rules-based regional order, which has been a preoccupation of this conference for many years – and I would associate myself with your strong remarks. All of us here in Asia have the right to make our own way without coercion. I would like to thank you, too, for your comment on alliances.
But I would like to ask you about the rules-based global order, which you mentioned at the outset of your remarks and in which President Trump appears to be an unbeliever. Secretary Acheson wrote 70 years ago that he was present at the creation of a US-led order that has served all of us well. General, given everything over the past four months, including NATO and the Trans‑Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Paris, why should we not fret that we are present at the destruction of that order? Please give us cause for optimism, General.
Representative Taro Kono, Member, House of Representatives, Japan
I am Taro Kono, member of the Japanese Parliament. I have explained to my constituency that the US-Japan alliance is not just about security, but it is an alliance to share and promote our common values such as democracy, human rights, freedom of press, free trade, environmental protection and so forth. Today, more and more people are asking if this alliance is just about security, not about the common values. Mr Secretary, what do you think? If this is an alliance based on common values, what are the common values we are trying to promote today? Thank you.
Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, Deputy Director, Strategic Research Institute, National Defense University, People's Liberation Army
General, I think I noticed that actually you mentioned strengthening the defence links between the US and Taiwan, and I think it is quite unusual for the Secretary of Defense of the United States to say so in this occasion. Does it mean that there is some change with regard to the One China policy of the US? Thank you.
Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for International Law; Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge
Thank you very much for permitting me this question. I had actually two quick questions. My first one relates to the statement made by your former National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Asian Affairs, Dan Kritenbrink, on the day of the tribunal’s ruling in the Philippines’ case against China. Now, he said that the US has made it clear that, ‘We have top national interests in the South China Sea, just as China does, and just as many other countries in the region do,’ and that the United States will not ‘turn a blind eye to the waterway in exchange for cooperation elsewhere.’ Can we expect the same approach from the current US administration? In other words, can we expect it not to sacrifice the South China Sea, in a sense, for cooperation, say on North Korea?
My second question will be about your statement that the US will not be accepting unilateral changes to the status quo. In this respect, I presume you mean the island-building and construction activities as well as militarisation of beaches in the South China Sea. May I please know how the US intends to approach this question? What are the specific acts that it intends to do to prevent this unilateral change in status quo? Thank you.
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