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中評月刊：美對華海上商業競爭分析

http://www.CRNTT.com   2025-10-16 00:24:27

注釋： 　　〔1〕Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro，Delivers Remarks at Harvard Kennedy School，26 September 2023，https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3538420/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-harvard-kennedy-school/. 　　〔2〕Federal Maritime Commission，Order of Investigation into Transit Constraints at International Maritime Chokepoints，https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-04042.pdf. 　　〔3〕American Consortium’s Purchase of Hong Kong-Owned Port Terminals Has Implications Far Beyond Panama，https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/IP25026.pdf. 　　〔4〕Section 301Investigation Report on China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominanc，January 16，2025，https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf. 　　〔5〕本次行動設定了180天的期限，服務費將分兩個階段實施：前180天的適用費用為0美元。180天後：第一階段：根據美國每次航行的淨噸位向中國船舶所有者和經營者收取費用，並在隨後的幾年內逐步增加；根據淨噸位或集裝箱數量向中國建造船舶的運營商收取費用，並在接下來的幾年中逐步增加；為了激勵美國建造的汽車運輸船，將根據外國建造的汽車運輸船的容量收取費用。第二階段行動三年內不會發生：為了激勵美國建造的液化天然氣（LNG）船舶，限制通過外國船舶運輸LNG。 　　〔6〕Bipartisan SHIPS Act Aims to Counter China’s Maritime Dominance with 250-Ship Fleet Expansion，April 30, 2025，https://gcaptain.com/bipartisan-ships-act-aims-to-counter-chinas-maritime-dominance-with-250-ship-fleet-expansion/. 　　〔7〕自該命令發布之日起210天內，美國總統國家安全事務助理應與國務卿、國防部長、商務部長、勞工部長、交通部長、國土安全部長、美國貿易代表以及總統國家安全事務助理認為適當的行政部門和機構（機構） 負責人協調，通過機構和管理和預算辦公室主任向總統提交海事行動計劃，以實現該命令中規定的政策。 　　〔8〕Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Trump’s Executive Order to Restore U.S. Maritime Dominance，April 9, 2025,https://gcaptain.com/trump-signs-executive-order-to-revitalize-u-s-shipbuilding-amid-chinas-maritime-dominance/. 　　〔9〕Revitalised SHIPS for America Act tied to USTR China vessel fees，Barry Parker, May 1,2025 https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/revitalised-ships-for-america-act-tied-to-ustr-china-vessel-fees. 　　〔10〕Brent Sadler，Ensuring America’s Maritime Security，June 4, 2024，https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/ensuring-americas-maritime-security。 　　〔11〕澳大利亞、印度、日本和美國領導人發表《威爾明頓宣言聯合聲明》，2024年9月21日，https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/chinese/the-wilmington-declaration-joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-australia-india-japan-and-the-united-states-zh/。 　　〔12〕王旭：《美西方的港口對衝計劃》，《瞭望》2024年第23期。 　　〔13〕G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity，March 14, 2025，https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html. 　　〔14〕RESTORING AMERICA’S MARITIME DOMINANCE，April 9, 2025，https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/restoring-americas-maritime-dominance/. 　　〔15〕Labor unions call on Trump to boost US shipbuilding against increasing Chinese dominance，February 20, 2025，https://apnews.com/article/trump-shipbuilding-labor-unions-china-tariffs-9d55363e6b8afff3d9cda971fc692cfd. 　　〔16〕Iris Deng, “What China is doing to make ports ‘smart’ and not prone to work stoppages,”South China Morning Post，November 11, 2024,https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3285840/what-china-doing-make-ports-smart-and-not-prone-work-stoppages. 　　〔17〕Joint-Homeland-China-Select-Port-Security-Report，https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Joint-Homeland-China-Select-Port-Security-Report.pdf. 　　〔18〕Liner shipping connectivity index, quarterlyLast updated 12 Dec. 2024，https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.LSCI. 　　〔19〕Statement before the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security，February 11, 2025,https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-02/ts250211_Berg_Port_Investments.pdf?VersionId=1ls0ZK2aUnoFyOHjjpKBtXwfQIRGTdGf. 　　〔20〕Are Chinese Ports in Latin America Preferred by Organized Crime?September 23, 2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-chinese-ports-latin-america-preferred-organized-crime；The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas，September 23, 2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas. 　　〔21〕Responding to China’s Growing Influence in Ports of the Global South， October 30，2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-chinas-growing-influence-ports-global-south. 　　〔22〕Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert，Pier CompetitorChina’s Power Position in Global Ports，International Security，Vol.46，No.4，2022. 　　〔23〕America’s Maritime Blind Spot: How China is Gaining the Upper Hand on the High Seas Posted，March 5, 2025，https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/americas-maritime-blind-spot-how-china-gaining-upper-hand-high-seas. 　　〔24〕Management of Panama Canal ports by Hong Kong firm poses risks, US House panel hears，17 May 2024，https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3262984/management-panama-canal-ports-hong-kong-firm-poses-risks-us-house-panel-hears. 　　〔25〕US port fee proposals to have little effect on China amid healthy bulk ship orders，April 30, 2025，https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/us-port-fee-proposals-to-have-little-effect-on-china-amid-healthy-bulk-ship-orders/. 　　〔26〕Import Cargo Levels to See First Year-Over-Year Drop Since 2023 as Impact of Tariffs Increases,May 9, 2025，https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/import-cargo-levels-to-see-first-year-over-year-drop-since-2023-as-impact-of-tariffs-increases. 　　〔27〕LNG companies say they cannot comply with Trump rules on Chinese ships，April 27 2025，https://www.ft.com/content/bc632c27-b598-402d-b3bf-b0b87eda528e. 　　〔28〕2022 Annual Report to Congress，November 2022，https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/2022_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 　　〔29〕Thinking Through Protracted War with China Nine Scenarios，Feb 26, 2025，https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1475-1.html. 　　（全文刊載於《中國評論》月刊2025年9月號，總第333期，P12-19）

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